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**Causal Inference Presentation**

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# **Overview**

# • Causal inference stems from the recognition that there exists data generating

- mechanisms under the phenomenon of interest
- We only have partial knowledge of the model of such mechanism
- In fact, we only observe some features and data that are emitted by this mechanism - an analogy is we see smoke, we know that comes from fire but we don't see the fire or how it was made



Underlying mechanism (unobserved)







# **Different types of data have different value Let's take a very physical viewpoint on this cost**

#### **In increasing order**

- QDI • Observational P(X) - prima facie - done using sensors (camera etc.)
- Joint observations  $P(X, Y)$  done using sensors AND human labelers- more expensive
- Conditional P(Y|X) computed from Joint and then marginalisation
- Interventional (cost of experiments that include changing physical setting etc.)
- Counterfactual imagining different observations and their outcomes (can be infinite cost if these are not realisable) ….



#### **Kalman Filter (ubiquitous in autonomous cars) Algorithm to estimate under uncertainty**

- The most common way to deal with this uncertainty is to use an algorithm called Kalman Filter (KF). A KF is based on a predictor-corrector structure
- The algorithm models physics of the robot such as displacement, velocity, acceleration etc.
- Importantly the algorithm keeps room for uncertainty in the form of a Multivariate Gaussian with zero mean and flexible variance
- The algorithm updates its predictions and uncertainty estimates using measurements (again it allows for uncertainty in measurements)

#### **A motivating example from Robotics Before going into theory, let's ground our intuition in a real world problem**

- Probabilistic robotics deals with uncertainty due to :
- 1. Unmodeled physics 2. Measurement noise
- This image shows the prediction estimate based on physics and measurement noise from a beacon to determine the robot's position



### **Robot Kalman filter example Let's model an autonomous boat that must navigate in the sea**

• F - Plant model (Pre-determined system model e.g. a constant velocity model

- Predict Equation:  $x(k | k 1) = F$ .  $x(k 1 | k 1) + Bu(k)$
- step
- 
- resistance/unexpected bumps in the road etc.)
- u(k) Control vector which indicated action taken by robot in units of acceleration

• Where: x(k|k-1) - state prediction at time step k conditioned on previous time

• B - Process noise model (noise due to unmodelled uncertainties e.g. wind/air-

### **Robot Kalman filter example Predict equation (closer look)**

- $x(k|k-1) = F \cdot x(k-1|k-1) + Bu(k)$  $\begin{picture}(150,10) \put(0,0){\line(1,0){10}} \put(15,0){\line(1,0){10}} \put(15,0){\line($ *x*  $\dot{x}$ <sup>*t*</sup> <sup>=</sup> [ 1 Δ*t* 0 1 ] [ *x* · *<sup>x</sup>*]*t*−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> **<sup>Q</sup>** [ 0.5Δ*t* 2 Δ*t* ] *f t m*
- Here we see the Plant model is chosen to be a constant velocity model
- Any acceleration due to unmodeled factors are considered as noise
- The typical simplifying assumption is that Q, the process noise covariance is that it is drawn iid from  $\mathcal{Q} \sim N(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I})$

# **Any ways to improve on the prediction model?**

- Typically feedback comes from measurement in the form of the difference between the predicted and observed state
- Let's consider modelling the uncertainty in the plant model in a causal setting
- Let's say that there are two external forces in our system namely wind and waves of the sea
- Can we utilise this knowledge to formulate a causal problem?



• The relations between wind and waves on the displacement can be captured

# in a joint distribution

- Both wind and waves will have an effect on the boat's direction and displacement
- 
- Can we make a causal diagram from this information?

• The displacement of the boat is clearly correlated with the velocity of the boat

#### • In the interest of making the joint smaller for illustration only, assume wind and waves can blow along only 1 dimension and the direction in indicated by +1 and -1







### **Causal diagram of our autonomous boat system Utilizing causal relations of the surroundings**

**Wind** 





# Displacement x Velocity dx/dt

# **Can we leverage this knowledge of the physical surrounding ? Can we improve the Kalman filter navigation algorithm?**

- Let's say we wish to use this causal information to improve:
- 1. The accuracy (low error) of the predicted state vector
- 2. The uncertainty (low covariance) in the predicted state vector
- 3. The time taken for the Kalman filter to converge to the true state
- So that the boat doesn't hit an obstacle, doesn't steer off course, is not very bumpy and is safe.
- How can we achieve these aims?



# **Some ideas: Observation**

- **• Use wind as an early indicator?**
- 
- **•**

**• Wind variable is a parent of the waves so it could be a warning that the boat will be pushed in a certain direction if we measure wind speed.** 

# **A modification Now let's suppose the autonomous boat has a wind sail**

# **• and we wish to use the Kalman filter to control the sail position to help**  Windsail Control

us navigate Wind



Displacement x Velocity dx/dt

# **Possible joint due to the interaction of wind sail**

#### • SAIL mirrors wind in this case (sail is programmed to follow the direction of

wind)



### **Intervention This lets us ask new types of questions now**

**• What would be the effect on the velocity of the boat if the windsail was** 

**• This intervention has not actually been realised but the autonomous** 

- **set to value SAIL = 1 (a certain direction) & we observed wind =1, waves=-1 (note we are detaching effects of wind on SAIL)**
- **system would like to know the probable effects before actually performing this control action**
- **wind and waves?**

**• Would the system be able to infer this just from the observations of the** 

# **Counterfactual Yet another type of question**

- Given that we have observed for wind  $= 1$  and waves  $= 1$  sail=1 that  $x = 3$
- $= -1$  sail $= 1$

 $\bullet$ 

• what position 'x' would the boat be at if it were the case that wind=1 waves

# **Formalism of the above concepts Let's conclude the motivating example and make the ideas formal**

- It is clear that the underlying mechanisms behind the observational data must be accounted for
- There are categories of questions to be posed
- Aim: use observations to answer questions about unobserved events
- We are inspired to breakdown a phenomenon into modular components and describe how these components interact to produce an emergent behaviour
- Doing so allows surgical intervention, decision making & autonomy



# **Structural Causal Models (What?)**

- An SCM denoted by  $M$  is a way to formalise the underlying process that generated the data which we can observe.  $\mathbb{M} = \langle \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}, \mathbb{F}, P(\mathbf{U}) \rangle$
- U is a set of background variables i.e. things we do not wish to explicitly model in our system but contribute to the uncertainty of variables we care for
- $\bullet\;$   $\mathbb {V}$  is the set of variables that we care to make causal queries on and are determined by other variables in the model V∪ U
- $\bullet\;\mathbb{F}$  is a set of functions that relates observable variables to its parents and unobserved variables  $v_i \leftarrow f_i(pa_i, u_i)$

# **How SCMs relate to the autonomous boat?**

- U = factor affecting wind and waves e.g. temperature & pressure of an unknown place (because of complex spatial interactions)
- V = wind, waves, sail direction, displacement, velocity
- P(U) = from meteorological data we can determine distributions over wind & waves but they are too complex to have a deterministic function

$$
F = \begin{cases} \text{wind} \leftarrow f_{wi}(U_T, U_P) \\ \text{waves} \leftarrow f_{wa}(U_T \land \text{wind}) \\ \text{suit} \leftarrow \text{wind} \\ x \leftarrow \text{wind} \land \text{waves} \land \text{sail} \end{cases}
$$

# **Seeing (Layer 1) Formalized as a mapping of events that occur with some uncertainty**

- A joint distribution and conditional  $P(X, Y)$  and  $P(X | Y)$
- Nature evaluates F i.e. maps an external unobserved state which is distributed as P(U) into an observed state distributed as P(V)
- **Y** ⊆ **V**

distributions

•  $U = u$  is simply each instantiation of unobserved variables according to their



$$
P^M(y) = \sum_{\{u|Y(u)\}} P(u)
$$

# **Illustrating the Layer 1 (Seeing)**

- This figure illustrates what we saw in the previous slide in terms of equations.
- Think of F as a mapping of probabilistic events
- The grey shaded region is the

Unobserved while white is observed

External state

Transformation

Induced Distribution



### **A seeing type of query Computation example**

#### *P*(*Y* = 1|*X* = 1) = *P*(*Y* = 1,*X* = 1) *P*(*X* = 1) =  $\sum$ <sup>{</sup> $u|Y(u)=1, X(u)=1$ } $P(u)$  $\sum_{\{u|X(u)=1\}} P(u)$

• This is easily computed from the joint distribution of U,X,Y



# **Doing (Layer 2) Same as Layer 1 except some variables are fixed to constants**

- A modification of the SCM gives natural valuations for quantities of this kind •  $X = x$  is fixed while the remaining function mappings are intact :
- 

$$
F_x = \{f_i : V_i \notin I\}
$$

- Def: Potential response  $Y_x$  is the solution for Y (a subset of the endogenous variables V) of the set of equations  $F_{\chi}$
- Formally, for a unit  $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{u}$  from unobserved variables, nature evaluates  $F_x$
- This is the same as Layer 1 except a set of variables have been fixed to a constant

 $X}$ } ∪ { $X \leftarrow x$ }

# **Doing (Layer 2) Taking charge & acting on the situation to bring a certain change**

• Evaluation (the only difference from Layer 1 is  $Y_x$  instead of  $Y$ :

- $Y_x$  denotes the random variable induced by averaging the potential response  $Y_x(u)$  over all u according to *P*(*U*)
- This procedure disconnects X from any other source of "natural" variation from the original function
- This means changes is Y would be due to changes in X that occurred outside the modelled system in turn guaranteeing a causal effect

$$
P^M(y) = \sum_{\{u \mid Y_x(u)\}} P(u)
$$

#### **Intervention Computation**

•  $Y_x := Y \mid do(x)$  then from Bayes' rule: •  $P(Y|do(x), z) = P(Y_x | z_x) =$  $P(Y_x, z_x)$ 

• In our boat example, if we Intervene by setting sail = 1 Regardless of the wind

 $P(z_{\chi})$ = *P*(*Y*,*z*|*do*(*x*))  $P(z|do(x))$ 

$$
F = \begin{cases} \text{wind} \leftarrow f_{wi}(U_T, U_P) \\ \text{waves} \leftarrow f_{wa}(U_T \wedge \text{wind}) \\ \text{sail} \leftarrow 1 \\ x \leftarrow \text{wind} \wedge \text{waves} \wedge \text{sail} \end{cases}
$$

# **Calculating in the Autonomous Sail boat example**

# $P(x = 1 | do$ (sail = 1) =  $\Sigma_{u|Y_{x-1}(u)=1}P(u)$  $= \sum_{Y_{x-1}(U_T, U_p)=1} P(U_T, U_p)$

- Thus we could compute the probability of an outcome after intervening
- we have a P(U) distribution

• In this case, it turned out to be calculable from unobserved factors over which



#### **Imagining (Layer 3) Alternative observations AND outcomes than those manifested in reality**

• An SCM induces a family of joint distributions over counterfactual events

•  $P(Y_{X=1} = 1 | X = 1, Y = 1)$  is read as the probability of event Y=1 happening in an alternative reality had event X=1 taken place conditioned on the present



- $\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{x}}, \ldots, \mathbf{Z}_{\mathbf{w}}$  for any  $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \ldots, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{W} \subseteq \mathbf{V}$
- reality
- P(alternative reality of X & Y | present reality of X & Y)

# **Evaluating Counterfactual An example with some particular SCM**

 $P^M(y_x, \ldots, z_w) = \sum_{\mu} P^M(y_{\mu} - \mu, \mu)$ 

 $P(Y_{X=1} = 1 | X = 0, Y = 0) = \frac{P}{Y}$ 

$$
P(Y_{X=1} = 1, X = 0, Y = 0)
$$
  

$$
P(X = 0, Y = 0)
$$

=

$$
P\{u|Y_x(u)=y,...,Z_w(u)=z\}P(u)
$$

$$
\frac{\sum_{\{u|Y_{x=1}(u)=1, X(u)=0, Y(u)=0\}} P(u)}{\sum_{\{u|X(u)=0, Y(u)=0\}} P(u)}
$$

# **Counterfactual question for the robot example**

- Given that we have observed for wind  $= 1$  and waves  $= 1$  sail $= 1$  that  $x = 3$
- What position 'X' would the boat be at if it were the case that wind  $(W) = 1$ waves  $(A) = -1$  sail  $(S)=1$
- Limiting the equation for just X and W  $P(X_{W=1} = 1 | X = -1, W = -1)$
- Note that the case X=1 W=1 has not been realised so it is an alternative world
- The case on which we condition has been realised  $X = -1$  W $= -1$
- This type of question can be useful for the robot if it wants to learn a navigation policy using reinforcement learning and wishes to calculate 'cumulative regret'



# **A logical perspective Questions that have been posed and answered by a PCM**

- L1: How likely is Y given that we observe X?
- L2: How likely would Y be if one were to make it the case that  $X = x$ ?
- L3: Given I have observed X and Y, how likely would Y have been if X' had been true instead of X?

# **Symbolic Languages Definition**

- Let variables V be given and X,Y,Z  $\subseteq$  V. Each language  $L_i$  i=1,2,3 consists of Boolean combinations of inequalities between polynomials over terms  $P(\alpha)$  where  $P(\alpha)$  is an  $L_i$  term
- $L_1$  terms are of the form  $P(Y = y)$ encoding the probability that Y takes on values y
- $L_2$  terms additionally include probabilities of conditional expressions  $P(Y_x = y)$ giving probability that variable Y would take on values  $y$  were  $X=x$
- $L_{3}$  encodes probabilities over conjunctions of conditional ( $L_{2}$ ) symbolising the joint that all conditional statements hold simultaneously  $P(Y_x=y,\ldots,Z_{w}=z)$

# **Examples of this syntax**

- $L_1$ :  $P(X = 1 | Y = 1) = P(X = 1)P(Y = 1)$
- $L_2$ :  $P(Y_{X=1} = 1) = 3/4$  is the probability of Y taking on value 1 were X to take on value 1 is  $3/4$
- on the probability of necessity and sufficiency )  $≥ P(y|x) - P(y|x')$
- languages  $L_1, L_2, L_3$  (syntax) . If  $M^*$  is a fully specified SCM then its PCH is  $\epsilon$ fully specified

•  $L_3: P(y_x, y'_x) \ge P(y|x) - P(y|x')$  is a statement expressing a lower bound

• Def: Pearl Causal Hierarchy (PCH) is the collection of distributions induced by

**Q: Is there an increasing logical expressiveness for**  $L_1, L_2, L_3$ **? If not, then the hierarchy between these languages collapses**

- 
- U is distributed as a fair coin flip
- between  $M, M^*$ . This is enough to determine all  $L_3$  quantities.
- from correlations

\n- Consider an example where 
$$
M^* = \{U = \{U\}, V = \{X, Y\}, \mathbb{F}, P(U)\}
$$
\n- U is distributed as a fair coin flip  $F = \begin{cases} X \leftarrow U \\ Y \leftarrow X \end{cases}$
\n

• We must have  $f_Y(x, u) = x$  for any unit u or else  $L_2$ -probability  $P(y_x)$  differs between  $M$  and  $M^*.\,f_X$  is also determined by  $L_1$  requirement that  $P(x)$  match

• A 'collapse' would mean we can draw all possible causal conclusions merely

# **Collapse relative to** *M*\*

- $\cdot$  Let  $\Omega$  be the set of all possible SCMs
- Layer j of the causal hierarchy collapses to Layer 'i' with  $i < j$  relative to  $M^* \in \Omega$  if  $M^* \sim_i M$  implies that  $M^* \sim_j M$  for all  $M \in \Omega$
- almost any SCM the layers of the hierarchy remain distinct



• Theorem: Causal Hierarchy Theorem (CHT) almost never collapses i.e. for

# **A fundamental way to study causal inference A graphical perspective**

- So far we have seen a semantic and logical approach to the need for SCMs • We have also seen the presence of three layers of hierarchy which are in
- increasing order of expressivity
- In the motivating Kalman Filter example we tried to draw relations between factors in the model as a graph
- Now we formalise the notion of graphs and note the differences between the types of graphical approaches

# **Bayes Nets**

- acyclic graph (DAG)
- ideal for taking an event that occurred and predicting the likelihood that any one of several possible known causes was the contributing factor
- This classic Bayes net shows conditional **Sprinkler** Rain Probability relations between the variables**Grass wet**

#### • represents a set of variables and their conditional dependencies via a directed

# **A graphical perspective Why are Bayes Nets not enough?**

- What type of causal knowledge would allow us to make cross-layer inferences i.e. for example, go from  $P(Y|X)$  to  $P(Y|do(x))$
- Bayes nets although sometimes erroneously believed to encode causal knowledge unfortunately falls short on bridging the gap between layers 1 and 2
- Why? Because it fails to distinguish between two mechanisms that have the same observational data, same conditional independence relations (both of which can be found from a bayes net) but react differently to interventions which the bayes net can't inform us of.

# **Illustrating the mapping of SCMs and interventions Bayes net give an illusion of causality yet their test is interventions**

It is possible for different Data generating mechanisms To have the same observations Data and the same Conditional independence relations yet clearly Will have differing interventional reactions





# **Example of Bayes Net's inability for L2 inference**

$$
F_1 = \begin{cases} X \leftarrow U_x \\ Z \leftarrow X \oplus U_z \\ Y \leftarrow Z \oplus U_y \end{cases}
$$

 $P^{1,2}(V)$ 

**Observational** 





**Conditional Independenc e relations**

# **Assymetry between cause and effect A failing of L1 constraints to make L2 inferences**

- Cause (X) may change the effect on a certain variable (Y)
- But that doesn't imply that changing this effect variable (Y) will alter the cause variable (X)
- Figure shows that observational data is not enough to differentiate different causal mechanisms or make L2 inference
- For example in the Bayes net image seen before, the arrow from Rain -> Sprinkler indicates Rain affects the outcome of sprinkler but not the other way round

# **Short-coming of Bayes Net (BN)**

- independences Y LX | Z
- The gap between L1 and L2 is not filled by Bayes net because it can't differentiate the causal effect of an intervention
- the sprinkler on the state of wetness
- We need to go one step further to formalise causal effects P(y|do(x))

#### • Bayes net is thus a tool for formalising L1 data P(x,y) P(x|y) and conditional

• For example in the Sprinkler Bayes net we can not find the effect of altering

# **Causal Diagram (Markovian) Constructed from an SCM**

- 1. A vertex for an endogenous variable every the SCM  $v_i$
- 2. A directed edge between each vertex that appears in the function  $f_i \in \mathbb{F}$
- Intuitively the arrow represents a master-slave relation  $A \rightarrow B$  means B listens to A)
- Functionally, the edge between A and B indicates that  $B \leftarrow f(A)$
- X causes Y and both are affected by an exogenous variable



# **Causal Bayesian Network (stronger than BN) Properties for a CBN in a Markovian setting**

- 1. Markovian  $P(v_i | pa_i, pa(pa_i)) = P(v_i | pa_i)$
- 2. Missing Link  $P(v_i | do(pa_i), do(x)) = P(v_i | do(pa_i))$  for  $V_i \in V, V_i \notin X$
- After intervening on the Parent of a variable, the variable is insensitive to any other intervention in the system
- 3. Parents do/see *P*(*vi*|*do*(*x*), *do*(*pai*
- observation, the same behaviour for it is observed

• Whether the function takes the value of its arguments by intervention or by

$$
a_i) = P(\nu_i | do(x), pa_i)
$$

# **Differences between CBN and BN**

#### • Encodes stronger assumptions than BN like constraints 2 and 3 seen in the

last slide

• Missing arrows in a BN indicating conditional independence

• While in CBN missing arrow indicates lack of direct effect

# **A Theorem about CBNs**

- Theorem: The causal Diagram induced by the SCM is a CBN for the collection of observational and experimental distributions induced by M
- CBN can act as a basis for causal reasoning when the SCM is not fully known and a collection of interventional distributions is not available.

# **Another Theorem about CBNs**

• Theorem- Truncated Factorization Product (Markovian): Let the graphical model G be a CBN for the set of interventional distributions. For any  $\mathbf{X} \subseteq \mathbf{V}$ the interventional L2 distribution  $P(V | do(X) = x)$  is identifiable through the truncated factorisation product:

 $P(v | do(x)) = \prod_{\{i | V_i \notin X\}} P(v_i | pa_i)$ *X*=*x*



- The L2 expression on the LHS is written in terms of the L1 observation RHS
- Note the factors relative to the intervened variables are removed

## **Back door criterion (Markovian setting) Markovian Models - those without unobserved confounders**

• For *any* treatment X and outcome Y, the interventional distribution

 $P(Y|do(x)) = \sum_{z} P(Y|x, z)P(z)$ 

- If the set of covariates Z is constituted by all pre-treatment variables and all relevant sources of variations are measured then adjusting for these variables will lead to the causal effect
- 

# **Blessings of a Markovian Situation A strong assumption but has nice properties**

- To re-emphasize: A markovian assumption is that every node is conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its parents (has no bearing on nodes which do not descend from it)
- Then the nice properties discussed above follow namely:
- CBN is a perfect surrogate for the Causal diagram induced by the SCM
- For any  $X \subseteq V$  the  $P(v | do(x))$  is identifiable through truncated factorization
- L2 quantities (causal effects) are computable from the observational data (L1 data)

# **Semi-Markovian Causal Bayes Networks Reality hits us in the form of Unobserved confounders**

- All relevant factors about the phenomenon under study are not measured • Example: Roll two dice and define events X & Y as sum and difference of
- outcomes.
- If  $X = 2$  then the outcomes have to be exactly 1 and 1. So  $P(Y=0) = 1$
- So clearly X & Y are not independent. How about put an arrow X ->Y
- That would mean X causes Y and so this should be true:  $P(Y|do(X = 2)) = P(Y)$  which is not (reporting X=2 doesn't change Y)

# **Unobserved confounder**

- explained by other variables in the model
- Neither can they be ignored because  $X$   $\perp$  *Y*!



 $P(Y|do(X)) = P(Y)$ 

• Realize: certain dependencies among endogenous variables cannot be

• This dotted arrow is neutral with respect to the interventional invariance i.e.

# **Causal Diagram (Semi-Markovian Models)**

- G is a causal diagram of an SCM if it is constructed as:
- 1. A vertex for every endogenous variable in **V**
- 2. An edge for for every  $V_i, V_j \in \mathbf{V}$  if  $V_j$  is an argument for  $f_i \in \mathbf{F}$
- 3. A bi-directed edge  $V_j < \, \, > V_i$  for every  $V_i, V_j \in V$  if  $U_i, U_j \subset U$  are correlated or the corresponding functions  $f_i, f_j$  share some  $U \in \mathbf{U}$  as an argument *i*  $, f_j$  share some  $U \in U$

# **Family Properties of Causal Diagrams A familiar Bayes net property does not hold**

- Each SCM induces a unique causal diagram (in contrast to Bayes net an SCM to BN mapping was not 1-1)
- Family relations in Semi-Markovian models are less well-behaved than in<br>Markovian



Notice: The markovian property of a variable being conditionally independent from its non descendants given its parents doesn't hold here. For node D

 ${Non-desc} \$   $\{Pa_d = \{A, F\}$ 

 $Pa_d = \{B, C\}$  and  $D \perp \{A, F\} | \{B, C\}$ 

Because of D <—>B <— A

# **Boundary of influence of nodes in a Graph A property about causal graphs that is important to understand**

- Think of this property as a region of influence of a node in a graph
- This region can be limited by conditioning on relatives of a node
- An analogy: let nodes represent members of a royal family in Europe
- Let us assume they are fighting for the throne as their objective
- If a member is independent of others then he/she gets the throne
- To condition on other nodes is similar to winning the confidence of these members - once conditioned on certain nodes they help you become independent from other ancestors. For Markovian case conditioning on parents was enough







# **Confounded Components A way to determine modularity in semi-markovian models**

- Parents. In Semi-Markovian we need a new property
- there exists a path made up entirely of bi-directed edges
- Looking at the image on the previous slide note that  $\{B, D\}, \{C, E\}, \{A\}, \{F\}$  form C-Components.

• Like we saw in the Markovian case - to partition nodes such that we can claim they are conditionally independent we only needed to condition on

• C-Components: Let  $\{C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_k\}$  be a partition over the set of variables  $\bf{V}$  where  $C_i$  is a confounded component if for every pair  $V_i, V_j$  of nodes in  $C_i$ 

# **C-Components continued**

- For each endogenous variable  $V_i$  we need to condition on :
- 1. its parents
- 2. Variables  $V_j$  in the same C-component siblings that precedes (topologically) it
- 3. Parents of the *Vj*
- Then  $V_i$  is shielded from other non-descendants in the graph
- 



• A Node should win confidence of its parents and its older sibling's parents to become independent of its non-descendants (easy to remember). Define this set as  $Pa_{\vec{l}}^{+}$ *i*

### **Semi-Markovian Relative Through an example**

- One topological order is A<B<C<D<E<F
- $P(v) = \prod_{v_i \in V} P_x(v_i | pa_i^{x+})$
- $pa_i^+ = Pa^1({\{V \in C(V_i) : V \le V_i\}}) \setminus {\{V_i\}}$
- Thus:
- $P(a, b, c, d, e, f) = P(a)P(b|a)P(c|a)P(d|b, c, a)P(e|d, c, a)P(f|a)$



# **Causal Bayesian Network (Semi-Markovian) Properties of a CBN in a semi-Markovian setting**

- Let  $P_*$  be the collection of all interventional distributions  $P(V | do(X = x))$
- A graphical model with directed and bidirected edges is a CBN if for every intervention :
- 1.  $P(V | do(x))$  is semi-Markov relative to  $G_{\bar{x}}$
- 2. For every  $V_i$  ∈  $V \setminus X$ ,  $W \subseteq V \setminus (Pa_i^+ \cup X \cup \{V_i\})$
- $P(v_i | do(x), pa_i^{x+}, do(w)) = P(v_i | do(x), pa_i^{x+})$
- intervention on other variables

• meaning conditioning on the set of augmented parents  $Pa_i^{x+}$  renders  $V_i$  invariant to an  $\frac{x+1}{i}$  renders  $V_i$ 

- Missing bidirected link: For every node, let us partition into two sets confounded and unconfounded parents  $Pa_i^c$  and  $Pa_i^u$  in  $P a_i^c$  and  $P a_i^u$  in  $G_{\bar{x}}$
- Then  $P(v_i | do(x), pa_i^c, do(pa_i^u) = P(v_i | do(x), pa_i^c, pa_i^u)$
- This means we are relaxing the stringent do/see conditions in a Markovian **CBN**

# **Identifiability**

• Effect identifiability: the causal effect of an action is said to be identifiable from P and G if for every two models with the same causal diagram G the observational distributions being equal implies the interventional distributions  $P^{1}(v) = P^{2}(v) \implies P^{1}(Y|do(x), z) = P^{2}(Y|do(x), z)$ 

- to also be equal
- This formalises the cross layer queries we wish to answer

# **Do -Calculus Building on top of d-separation for interventional distributions**

- We need rules that allow us to navigate among interventional distributions and jump across unrealised worlds
- These rules will be licensed by the invariances encoded in the causal graph
- Recall d-Separation



 $X \perp Z|Y$  *X*  $\perp Z|Y$  *X*  $\perp Z|Y$ 

• Rule 1 of d-separation is an extension of this but in the causal graph  $G_{\bar{X}}$ 







# **Rule 1**

- 
- 
- This is about adding or removing observations

# • Let G be the CBN for  $P_*$ then for any disjoint sets  $\ X, Y, Z, W \subset V^* \setminus V$ • Rule 1:  $P(y | do(x), z, w) = P(y | do(x), w)$  if  $(Y \perp Z | X, W)$  in  $G_{\bar{X}}$



# **Rule 2**

- 
- This is exchanging an action with an observation or vice versa
- After observing Z, Y reacts to X in the same way with or without intervention
- •

#### • Rule 2:  $P(y | do(x), do(z), w) = P(y | do(x), z, w)$  if  $(Y \perp Z | X, W)$  in  $G_{\bar{XZ}}$



- 
- This is about Adding or removing actions
- effect on Z

#### • Rule 3:  $P(y | do(x), do(z), w) = P(y | do(x), w)$  if  $(Y \perp Z | X, W)$  in  $G_{\bar{X}Z(\bar{W})}$

#### • If there is no causal path from X to Z then an intervention on X will have no



# **Back door Criterion**

- 1. No node in Z should be a descendent of X
- 2. Z should block every path between X and Y that contains an arrow into X
- Then the causal effect is identifiable by  $P(Y|do(x)) = \sum_{z} P(Y|x, z)P(z)$
- The most practical way of checking is by removing outgoing arrows from X and confirming whether Z separates X and Y

# **Front door Another identifiable criterion**

• Criteria:  $Z$  is said to satisfy the front-door criterion relative to  $X \& Y$  if

- $\bullet$  1.  $Z$  intercepts all directed paths from  $X$  to  $Y$ .
- 2. There is no unblocked backdoor path from  $X$  to  $Z$ .
- 3. All backdoor paths from  $Z$  to  $Y$  are blocked by  $X$ .
- The image shows the causal graph for the age old debate Regarding does smoking cause cancer. This happens to be ID



•

#### **Recent Developments**  Stochastic, conditional, and non-atomic interventions

- It may be challenging to assess the effect of new soft intervention from nonexperimental data
- Sigma Calculus and Soft interventions introduced by Correa and Bareinboim 2020 is a response to that

# **Conclusion**

- We have started this interesting topic with a motivating example from probabilistic robotics which is very much grounded in reality
- We referred to this time and again as the theories were introduced along with supplemental examples from text
- This slideshow has shown three distinct perspectives : Semantic, Logical and Graphical to tackle causal inference
- Hope the reader is inspired to do research in the same
- Thank you!
- Nihaar Shah (ns3413)